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A. Continuous exact non-atomic games are naturally associ-
ated to certain operators between Banach spaces. It thus makes sense
to study games by means of the corresponding operators. We char-
acterize non-atomic exact market games in terms of the properties of
the associated operators. We also prove a separation theorem for weak
compact sets of countably additive measures, which is of independent
interest.
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Given a measurable space (Ω,Σ), a TU (tranferable utility) game is a
set function ν : Σ → R such that ν (∅) = 0. Ω is the set of players, Σ
the σ-algebra of admissible coalitions and ν describes the worth of each
coalition. In this paper, we deal with games satisfying a certain number of
properties such as continuity, non-atomicity, exactness, etc. We recall the
main definitions. A coalition N ∈ Σ is null if ν (A ∪N) = ν (A) for all A
in Σ; an atom of ν is a non-null coalition A such that for every coalition
B ⊂ A either B or A \ B is null. A game ν is non-atomic if it has no
atoms ([5, p. 14] and [12, p. 55]). Let {An} be a sequence in Σ, and for
each n let Acn denotes the complement of An. A game ν is continuous if
limn→∞ ν (An) = limn→∞ (ν (Ω)− ν (Acn)) = 0 whenever An ց ∅. The core
of a game ν is the set
core(ν) = {µ ∈ ba (Σ) : µ (Ω) = ν (Ω) and µ(A) ≥ ν(A) for all A ∈ Σ}.
where ba(Σ) denotes the Banach space of charges (= finitely additive mea-
sures) on Σ endowed with the variation norm. Clearly, the core is always a
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weak∗-compact, convex subset of ba (Σ). A game ν is exact if core(ν) = ∅
and
ν (A) = min
µ∈core(ν)
µ (A) , ∀A ∈ Σ.
A game ν is the lower envelope of a set K of charges on Σ if it satisfies
(1.1) ν (A) = inf
µ∈K
µ (A)
for all A ∈ Σ. It is the upper envelope of K if the inf in (1.1) is replaced by a
sup. Several classes of games are directly defined as lower/upper envelopes of
charges. Examples include the thin games of Amarante and Montrucchio [4]
and the symmetric coherent capacities of Kadane and Wasserman [9]. The
first obtain when the set K in (1.1) is a thin set of non-atomic (countably
additive) measures [4, Definition 5];1 the second when all the charges in
K satisfy the following symmetry condition [9, Section 1]: there exists a
non-atomic probability measure λ such that2
λ(A) = λ(B) =⇒ µ (A) = µ (B) for all µ ∈ K
Other classes of games, while defined in a different way, are representable
as lower/upper envelopes. This is the case for the class of exact games
mentioned above: it is easy to see that a game is exact if and only if
it is the lower envelope of a (norm-bounded) subset K of baα (Σ), where
baα (Σ) = {µ ∈ ba (Σ) : µ (Ω) = α,α ∈ R}. Moreover, several important
subclasses of exact games (besides the thin games above) are also lower
envelope games. In fact, owing to results of Schmeidler [13] and Marinacci-
Montrucchio [12, pp. 54-58], continuous exact games and continuous ex-
act non-atomic games are also lower envelopes games. The former obtain
when K is a weak compact subset (in baα (Σ)) of countably additive mea-
sures, while the latter requires that, in addition, all the measures be non-
atomic. Finally, by virtue of a result of Amarante-Maccheroni-Marinacci-
Montrucchio [3, Theorem 3], the class of exact non-atomic market games is
also a class of lower envelope games, which obtains whenever K is a norm-
compact subset of baα (Σ).
1For M ⊂ L1 (Ω,Σ, λ) and S ∈ Σ, the subset M (S)⊥ ⊂ L∞ (Ω,Σ, λ) is given by
M (S)⊥ = {ϕ ∈ L∞ (Ω,Σ, λ) : 〈f, ϕ〉 = 0 for all f ∈M and ϕχ
Sc
= 0} .
A set M ⊂ L1 (Ω,Σ, λ) is thin, if and only if M (S)⊥ = {0} for all S such that λ (S) > 0
(see [10])
2The definition in [9, Section 1] is slightly different, yet obviously equivalent, to the one
given in the text.
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For lower/upper envelope games, the link between the game and the set
of charges defining it is not always sharp. That is, as the next example of
Huber and Strassen [8] shows, different sets of charges might define the same
game.
Example 1 (Huber and Strassen [8]). Let Ω = {1, 2, 3} and consider the
two measures on Ω defined by µ = (12 ,
1
2 , 0) and λ = (
4
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6). Let ν be the
lower envelope game defined by C1 = co {µ, λ} (where co denotes the convex
hull). That is,
ν (A) = inf
ξ∈C1
ξ (A)
for all A ⊂ Ω. It is easy to check that
(a)
core(v) = C2 =
{(
3 + t
6
,
3− t− s
6
,
s
6
)
: 0 ≤ s, t ≤ 1
}
(b) For all A ⊂ Ω
min
ξ∈C1
ξ (A) = ν (A) = min
ξ∈C2
ξ (A)
(c) C1 is strictly included in C2.
It is easy to see that the situation described by the example is fairly typical
whenever the game has atoms. The next proposition shows, however, that
the situation is dramatically different in the non-atomic case.
Proposition 1. Let ν : Σ −→ R be a continuous, exact non-atomic game.
Then, ν is the lower envelope of a unique, weak compact (in ba(Σ)), convex
set of non-atomic measures.
Proof. By the result of Marinacci-Montrucchio mentioned above [12, pp. 54-
58], continuous exact non-atomic games are lower envelopes games defined
by a weak-compact set K ⊂ baα(Σ) consisting of non-atomic measures. By
the Bartle-Dunford-Schwartz Theorem (see [6, Cor. 6, p. 14]), the weak
compactness of K implies that there exists a non-atomic finite measure λ on
Σ such that all the measures in K are absolutely continuous with respect to
λ. Thus, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, K is isometrically isomorphic to
a weak compact subset K′ of L1(λ) ([7, Th. IV.9.2]). Since it is continuous,
exact and non-atomic, the game ν, however, is also the lower envelope of
its core. By Schmeidler’s theorem [13] and [7, Th. IV.9.2], this is also
isometrically isomorphic to a weak compact subset K′′ of L1(λ). Clearly,
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the inclusion K ′ ⊂ K ′′ always holds. We are going to show that necessarly
K′ = K ′′ whenever ν is continuous, exact and non-atomic.
The dual of L1(λ) is the Banach space L∞(λ) of Σ-measurable, λ-essentially
bounded functions on Ω. Let Φ denote the intersection of the positive cone
with the unit ball in L∞(λ). Since λ is finite and non-atomic, the indicator
functions are weak*-dense in Φ (see [10]). Now, suppose that the exists
a κ ∈ K ′′\K′. The sets K ′ and {κ} are both weak compact. Thus, by
the Separating Hyperplane Theorem (see [7, Th. V.2.10]) there exists a
ϕ0 ∈ L
∞(λ)− {0} and a ε > 0 such that∫
ϕ0kdλ+ 2ε < min
k˜∈K′
∫
ϕ0k˜dλ
Wlog, we can assume that ϕ0 ∈ Φ (otherwise take
ϕ0−essinfϕ0
‖ϕ0−essinfϕ0‖
).
Consider the functions
F : Φ× {k} −→ R , F (ϕ, k) =
∫
ϕkdλ
G : Φ×K ′ −→ R , G(ϕ, k˜) =
∫
ϕk˜dλ
where Φ is endowed with the weak*-topology (and is compact in this
topology) and K ′ is endowed with the weak-topology (and is compact in
this topology). By the continuity of the function F . there exists a weak*-
neighborhood of ϕ0, W (ϕ0), such that
ϕ ∈W (ϕ0) =⇒
∣∣∣∣
∫
ϕ0kdλ−
∫
ϕkdλ
∣∣∣∣ < ε
Since the function G is jointly continuous and K ′ is compact, the Maxi-
mum Theorem (see [1, Theorem 17.31]) implies that there exists a weak*-
neighborhood of ϕ0, U(ϕ0), such that
ϕ ∈ U(ϕ0) =⇒
∣∣∣∣min
k˜∈K′
∫
ϕ0k˜dλ− min
k˜∈K′
∫
ϕk˜dλ
∣∣∣∣ < ε
Thus, for ϕ ∈ U(ϕ0) ∩W (ϕ0) we have
min
k˜∈K′
∫
ϕk˜dλ > min
k˜∈K′
∫
ϕ0k˜dλ− ε
>
∫
ϕ0kdλ+ 2ε− ε
>
∫
ϕkdλ+ 2ε− ε− ε =
∫
ϕkdλ
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Since the indicator functions are weak*-dense in Φ, one can take ϕ = χA,
the indicator function of the set A ∈ Σ, and the preceding states that there
is a measure µk ∈ core(ν) such that
µk(A) < min
µ∈K
µ(A)
which contradicts the fact that ν is the lower envelope of bothK and core(ν).

The result of Proposition 1 subsumes earlier results of Amarante-Maccheroni[2],
who obtained it for thin cores, and of Amarante-Maccheroni-Marinacci-
Montrucchio [3], who obtained it for norm compact cores. With obvious
modifications (i.e., by replacing the core with the anti-core), it also applies
to symmetric coherent capacities as the symmetry condition of Kadane and
Wasserman [9] implies that those cores are weak compact (see [11]). The
same argument as that used in the proof of Proposition 1 leads to the fol-
lowing Corollary, which is of independent interest.
Corollary 1. Let C1 and C2 be two convex, weak-compact subsets of ba(Σ),
which consists of countably additive non-atomic measures. If C1 ∩ C2 = ∅,
then there exists A ∈ Σ such that
min
µ∈C1
µ(A) > max
µ∈C2
µ(A)
3. F 
  

Another property common to both thin games and exact non-atomic mar-
ket games is that they are both naturally associated with certain compact
operators. To see this, let us begin by observing that any continuous exact
game is naturally associated with a linear operator L∞(λ) → l∞(I). For
if ν is continuous and exact, then core(ν) is isometrically isomorphic (by
Schmeidler’s theorem) to a subset F = {fi}i∈I ⊂ L
1(λ), and we can define
the operator Tν : L
∞(λ)→ l∞(I) by
Tνϕ = (
∫
ϕfidλ)i∈I .
Tν is the integral of the vector measure µ : Σ −→ l
∞(I) defined by
A −→ (
∫
χAfidλ)i∈I .
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We observe that (a) F weakly compact =⇒ µ bounded and countably addi-
tive; and (b) the Bartle-Dunford-Schwartz theorem implies that Tν is always
weak* to weak continuous (see [6, Corollary 7, p. 14]).
Theorem 1. Tν is a compact operator when ν is either an exact non-atomic
market game or ν is a thin game.
Proof. (1) If ν is an exact non-atomic market game, then core(ν) ∼ F =
{fi}i∈I ⊂ L
1(λ) and is compact in the L1-norm by [3, Theorem 3]. Let
R ≡ Tν |BL∞(λ) , that is R is the restriction of Tν to the unit ball BL∞(λ)
in L∞(λ). We are going to show that R is weak* to norm continuous,
which immediately implies compactness of Tν . To this end, consider the
family of linear functionals F =
{∫
·fidλ | i ∈ I
}
on L∞(λ). By considering
the restrictions of the functionals to BL∞(λ), we can view F as a subset
of C(BL∞(λ)). Since F is norm-compact, it is equicontinuous by Arzelà-
Ascoli’s theorem. Hence, for any ϕ∗ ∈ BL∞(λ) and ∀ε > 0, there exists a
weak* neighborhood U(ϕ∗) such that
ϕ ∈ U(ϕ∗) =⇒ ‖Rϕ−Rϕ∗‖∞ = supi∈I
∣∣∣∣
∫
ϕfidλ−
∫
ϕ∗fidλ
∣∣∣∣ < ε,
which proves that Tν is bounded-weak* to norm continuous.
(2) Let core(ν) ∼ F = {fi}i∈I ⊂ L
1(λ). If ν is thin, then the norm-
closure of the range of the vector measure µ is convex [10]. By letting K0
denote the set of indicator functions in L∞(λ), and by K = [L∞(λ)]1, we
have
Tν(K) = Tν(K0)
w
= µ(K0)
w
= µ(K0).
The first equality follows from the fact — noted above — that Tν is always
weak* to weak continuous, the second is a definition and the third fol-
lows from µ(K0)
w
=
[
µ(K0)
]w
= µ(K0). In fact, µ(K0) is convex, and
we have
[
µ(K0)
]w
=
[
µ(K0)
]
= µ(K0). Now, Tν(K) norm-compact =⇒
Tν(BL∞(λ)) = Tν(K−K) — the image of the ball — is norm-compact. Hence,
Tν is a compact operator. 
4. A 
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Thin games need not be market games as thin sets need not be norm-
compact (see [4]). We now give a necessary and sufficient condition for a
continuous exact game (hence, a thin game) to be a market game. It is
stated in terms of the properties of the operator Tν encountered above.
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Theorem 2. A continuous exact game ν is a market game if and only if
the associated operator Tν is bounded-weak* to norm continuous.
3
Proof. If ν is a market game, then core(ν) ∼ F = {fi}i∈I ⊂ L
1(λ) and is
compact in the L1-norm by [3, Theorem 3]. By the proof of Theorem 1 part
(1), Tν is bounded-weak* to norm continuous.
In the converse direction, assume that Tν is bounded-weak* to norm con-
tinuous. We are going to show that this implies that the support functional
of F , σF : L
∞(λ)→ R,
σF (ϕ) = sup
i∈I
∫
ϕfidλ,
is continuous for the bounded weak*-topology. In fact, let ϕ∗ ∈ L∞(λ).
There exists α ∈ R such that ϕ∗ ∈ αBL∞(λ). Since Tν |αBL∞(λ) is weak*-
to-norm continuous, ∀ε > 0 here exists a weak* neighborhood U(ϕ∗) such
that
ϕ ∈ U(ϕ∗) ∩ αBL∞(λ) =⇒ sup
i∈I
∣∣∣∣
∫
ϕfidλ−
∫
ϕ∗fidλ
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
Combining this with the elementary inequality: If w, z ∈ RI are bounded,
then ∣∣∣∣sup
I
w − sup
I
z
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
I
|w − z|
we get (by observing that for ϕ ∈ BL∞(µ) and fi ∈ L
1 (λ), the mapping
w = (
∫
ϕfidµ)i∈I is a bounded element of R
I)
ϕ ∈ U(ϕ∗)∩αBL∞(λ) =⇒ |σF(ϕ)− σF(ϕ
∗)| ≤ sup
i∈I
∣∣∣∣
∫
ϕfidλ−
∫
ϕ∗fidλ
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
Now, σF continuous for the bounded weak*-topology implies, by Lemma
3 in [3], that F is compact in the norm topology. That is, ν is market
game. 
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